Shaping the Saudi state: human agency’s shifting role in rentier-state formation by Hertog, Steffen
xxx 07-107 August 20, 2007 10:1
Int. J. Middle East Stud. 39 (2007), 539–563. Printed in the United States of America
DOI: 10.1017/S0020743807071073
Steffen Hertog
SH AP IN G TH E SAUD I STATE : H UM AN AGENC Y ’S
SH IFT IN G RO LE IN REN T IER -STATE
FO RM AT IO N
There are two established ways of recounting the emergence of the modern Gulf oil
monarchies. The social scientific explanation describes anonymous structural forces,
the “resource curse” of the “rentier-state,” and how these forces have shaped politics
and markets with their inexorable logic. The other narrative, of the popular history
variety, offers romantic, personalized accounts of desert shaykhs, their whims, and the
sudden riches of their families (complemented, in some less benevolent accounts, by
tales of monumental corruption).
In its analysis of the creation of the Saudi Arabian administration, this article will, to a
surprising degree perhaps, side with the shaykhs. This is despite—or rather because of—
its ambition to be theoretically informed. By stressing the role of elite decisions in state
creation in Saudi Arabia, it will bring personality and politics back into the structurally
overdetermined accounts of the creation of Gulf states and of rentier systems in general.1
The article will look specifically at the formative period of state formation between
1951 and 1962, when the interplay of administrative growth and elite politics and
patronage and factionalism was the most intense and the institutional setting the most
fluid. The account has three main aims. First, it aims to explain how early conflicts
and deals between senior political figures “congealed” into institutional constellations
that have shaped the kingdom’s political landscape until today. Rapidly growing oil
income temporarily gave the Saudi political elite great autonomy in designing the
shape of their expanding state, and institutions were unusually flexible tokens in power
games. Second, the article intends to explain how the Saudi administration developed
a degree of segmentation early on, that is, the tendency of various institutions to be
little “states within the state,” a feature closely related to the early personalization of
institutional design. This segmentation has allowed the emergence of a few very efficient
bureaucratic islands but has also led to failures of coordination and the parallel building
of neopatrimonial bureaucratic fiefdoms, a feature still in evidence in today’s kingdom.
Increasing bureaucratization and regularization has often only solidified these cleavages.
Third, the article explains how the extreme social mobility offered by a rapidly expanding
state and its social networks created new players within the economic and political elite.
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This fluidity is in marked contrast to today’s mature and very static Saudi system in
which most stakes have been “parceled out,” both in business and bureaucracy. Many of
the Saudi elite and their institutions were made in a dozen dizzying years in the 1950s
and 1960s.
In theoretical terms, the aim of the article is to nuance several assumptions of the debate
on rentier-states by looking closely at the actual history of bureaucratic evolution in Saudi
Arabia, the literature’s staple rentier example. I intend to show that the autonomy of
rentier-states is not constant over time, as constraints grow with bureaucratic expansion.
I also demonstrate that external state income does not necessarily lead to inefficient
institutions but rather opens great leeway for institutional design that can be highly
efficient in some areas and patrimonial in others.
The article is divided into two halves. One describes the early jumble of institutional
growth that went along with increasing oil income and the expansion of Al Saud princes
into the state after 1951. The second half recounts how a more permanent distribution
of power and institutional resources emerged from the fundamental struggle between
King Saud and Crown Prince Faisal. A more brief section explains how the dispensation
that had emerged by 1962 subsequently grew and was consolidated, with the Saudi state
apparatus moving from great fluidity to bureaucratization and eventually great stasis,
immortalizing the institutional outcomes of earlier struggles.
My account is almost exclusively based on primary sources, significant parts of which
have been previously unexploited. I have used archives from three continents, including
U.S. and British diplomatic documents up to 1975, the extensive records of a 1960s
and 1970s Ford Foundation mission on administrative reform held at the Institute of
Public Administration in Riyadh, the Mulligan Papers at Georgetown University, and
the Philby archive at St. Antony’s College, in Oxford. Moreover, I conducted interviews
with seasoned diplomats, expatriate advisers, and former Saudi bureaucrats in London
and Riyadh. Finally, I draw on a large number of dissertations written by Saudis in
the West about Saudi administrative development issues and a number of contemporary
country studies and reports in 1950s and 1960s trade journals.
T H E L IT E R AT U R E
Although much has been written on the impact of the United States on the formation
of modern Saudi Arabia,2 little research has been done on the internal politics of the
formation of the modern Saudi state. Sarah Yizraeli’s valuable The Remaking of Saudi
Arabia3 remains the only account concerned primarily with Saudi elite politics in the
1950s and early 1960s, which I complement from a more institutional perspective:
Yizraeli concentrates mainly on the struggle between Faisal, Saud, and their princely
followers and is less concerned with the formation and composition of bureaucracy as
such. The fiefdom character and segmentation of administration and its interplay with
personal politics on various levels therefore are not in the focus of her analysis, which
results in a certain overemphasis on the “modern” aspects of institutional growth and
differentiation under Faisal.
Whereas Yizraeli focuses mainly on persons, the other main account of modern state
formation in Saudi Arabia, Kiren Aziz Chaudhry’s The Price of Wealth, conversely talks
almost exclusively about structural economic forces and institutions. Individual actors
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are largely absent from her account, which means that many specifics of institution
building I focus on go unexplained, and rationality and capacity of the early Saudi
administration are considerably exaggerated.4 My claim is that focusing on the interplay
of personal politics and institutional formation offers the most adequate perspective on
the formative years of the modern Saudi state.
In addition to contributing to the still thin historiography of Saudi state building, my
ambition is to challenge and contextualize several of the broader theoretical claims of
rentier-state theories, for which Saudi Arabia has often been used as an archetypical case.
There is no fully formulated, generally accepted rentier-state theory. There are, however,
a number of recurring hypotheses connected to effects of oil income on politics.
First, rentier theorists usually argue that oil income grants state elites increased au-
tonomy from social forces.5 Chaudhry was right to challenge this generalization in her
account of the 1980s economic crisis,6 in which entrenched distributional coalitions
managed to stall the regime’s austerity policies. I argue, however, that regime autonomy
was considerably higher at an early state of state building, before distributional networks
and entitlements were established on a large scale. In other words, state autonomy of
rentier-states seems to decline over time. This highlights the importance of early insti-
tutional decisions, which can create strong path dependencies that are not accounted for
in “static” rentier theories.
Second, my ambition is to disaggregate the state, which is usually dealt with in
the aggregate by rentier theorists7 (and, implicitly, by Chaudhry, as she sees all state
institutions subject to the same, although shifting, development dynamics over time).
By breaking up the state on a mesolevel, I show that different parts of it have followed
different trajectories, some developmental, some regressive, largely depending on how
early elite decisions shaped institutions. There is no automatic mechanism producing
regulatory failure and rent seeking in rentier-states.8
My account offers a way to look at the crucial role of oil in state building without
succumbing to rentier-state determinism. As Jill Crystal has shown in the cases of
Kuwait and Qatar, crucial junctures of regime formation shape later political options.9
What she does for state-business relations I do for politics within the state. Michael Herb
has drawn our attention to the dynamics of “dynastic rule” to explain elite politics and
regime survival in the Gulf.10 I analyze the impact of dynastic rule on state formation.
T H E S TAT E O F T H E S TAT E IN T H E E A R LY T O M ID -1 9 5 0 S
Verily, my children and my possessions are my enemies.
(Ibn Sa–ud briefly before his death)11
Patrimonial Rule under –Abd al-–Aziz
Modern bureaucracy is a recent phenomenon in Saudi Arabia. Its first elements were
created in the early 1950s, during King –Abd al-–Aziz’s last years, when oil income
was taking off. In the lean years before, the kingdom had not been ruled through a
differentiated administrative apparatus but rather through trusted regional governors
installed by the king and supported by other local intermediaries and clients, be they
notables or tribal shaykhs.
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On the national level, the system completely revolved around –Abd al-–Aziz, who was
king and chief legislator and had the right to review all judicial decisions.12 Most of
the departments of –Abd al-–Aziz’s court were occupied with the logistics of the court
itself and not broader administration or public services.13 From the western province,
taken from the Hashemites in the mid-1920s, –Abd al-–Aziz had inherited a somewhat
more elaborate bureaucratic structure, with special offices for health and education for
example.14
Altogether, however, most Saudis had no contact with formal administration, as apart
from basic security the state provided hardly any services to its citizens. There were
few formal, national bodies during most of –Abd al-–Aziz’s reign. The Ministry of
Foreign Affairs had been set up in 1930, under Faisal. Ministries of finance and defense
followed in 1937 and 1944. These agencies were not linked through formal mechanisms
of budgeting or governance.15
After World War II annual oil income started to increase rapidly—from $10.4 million
in 1946 to $56.7 million in 1950.16 While elderly –Abd al-–Aziz’s personal rule grew
increasingly slack due to his frailty,17 there was a growing need to manage the huge
sums of money flowing into the kingdom, as at least his second-oldest surviving son,
Faisal, and the American diplomats and oilmen present at the time realized.18 In the
absence of any scheme for budgeting and development, much of the oil income was
frittered away by the court, its clients, and their entourages.19 There was also another
reason for institution building: with the unquestioned patriarch leaving the stage, a new
generation of princes vied for power and prestige,20 giving them a stake in the creation
of new posts and ministries.
Analysis: A State Created above Society
The state would soon start to expand rapidly, providing posts for numerous princely☞ I’m just
diversifiying some
of these “grow”s. aspirants. I will argue that the way the state grew was an outcome largely of royal
elite decisions unconstrained by larger political forces. To substantiate that, some social
history is needed before I engage with princely dealings in detail.
In the 1950s the national income was still extremely small by standards of modern
statehood. However, the aggregate societal demands on it were even smaller21: Saudi
society, based on an economy that in most regions barely provided for subsistence needs,
was unprepared for the riches. Most politics werelocal; people were ruled through the Al☞ Even though this
could be “was,” it
sounded odd when
paired with
“most.”
Sa–ud’s tribal or notable intermediaries. The kingdom knew no public space to negotiate
over national budgets, which were fed externally and grew rather suddenly. Saudi Arabia
had no national constitution, no formal mechanisms of political participation, and no
experience of national politics. Society was deeply geographically fragmented.
There were no large and coherent social groups to voice demands toward the gov-
ernment. Merchants were quickly tied up in patronage structures.22 Their chambers
of commerce were state created and state dependent and had little voice in policy
making.23 Aramco researchers describe Saudi businessman as “more individualistic”
than their counterparts in other places, not interested in collective bargaining,24 which is
indeed completely absent from the historical record. Similarly, the independent power
of tribes had been crushed in the course of –Abd al-–Aziz’s conquest of the peninsula in
the 1920s and 1930s,25 and they were subsequently co-opted through royal subsidies,
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without much modern state infrastructure interfering or being demanded.26 The kingdom
had no working class, with the exception of Aramco workers in the eastern province,
whose demonstrations were harshly repressed in the 1950s and 1960s.27 Newspapers
were all closely supervised by the state, their boards usually controlled by princes or
senior public servants.28
Robert Vitalis cites a U.S. labor attache´’s early 1950s conclusion that Aramco “can
ignore public opinion, which is neither a force nor a voice.”29 American “New Dealers”
on a technical cooperation mission looked in vain for grassroots initiatives to support
in Saudi society. Municipal elections in the early 1960s were purely local phenomena
in which governors could control who would get elected and who would not,30 and in
which the population at large tended to take limited interest.31 Throughout the 1950s and
1960s there were no parties or other national interest organizations of which to speak.
The consultative council still extant in the western province had no real political role
and no popular backing.32
The Saudi –ulama», finally, were an important part of the ruling elite but, despite
popular myths, consistently deferred to royal prerogative, as was indeed their ideology.33
As far as they played a role in policy, this concerned matters of public morals, not the
specifics of bureaucracy building.34 With no national political traditions and most Saudis
not in touch with the administration, society hardly constrained the decisions that royal
elites made in building their state. A unique pattern of bureaucracy building ensued
in which yet-embryonic institutions became tokens of intra-elite bargaining among
ambitious princes and a limited number of commoner clients. There was, of course, an
underlying concern to build institutions that could administer the increasing flow of oil
income;35 but beyond this very general need, personal ambitions and bargains loomed
very large in determining specific outcomes.
In 1951 –Abd al-–Aziz created the basis for a rudimentary functional differentiation
of domestic bureaucratic institutions, separating the Ministry of Interior from the fiscal
and administrative affairs of the Ministry of Finance. Differentiation meant spread of
the royal family into state posts: the Ministry of Interior was given to Faisal’s son,
–Abdallah.36 In December 1953, briefly after –Abd al-–Aziz’s death, ministries of edu-
cation and agriculture were officially established as spin-offs from interior and finance
respectively. Aspiring Prince Sultan took charge of agriculture, his full brother, Fahd, of ☞ Commas depend
on whether there
are other full
brothers. No?
education.
There were few functioning mechanisms to coordinate their work. The formal intro-
duction of the Council of Ministers, in 1953, briefly before –Abd al-–Aziz’s death, had
changed little about actual practices of governance. The new King Saud, –Abd al-–Aziz’s
oldest surviving son, governed according to the patrimonial style of his father, basing
his rule on the court and embarking on grand tours through the country during which
he disbursed royal largesse.37 Decision making on major national questions remained
largely informal,38 and although service provision improved in some sectors, governance
was marred by “princely jealousies.”39
Institutional Design: “Form Follows Family”
It was largely intrafamily patrimonial politics that determined who would receive
which government post—this was no different from other clan-based, administratively
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underdeveloped political systems. However, patrimonial politics also determined much
of the very institutional design of the rapidly growing state during –Abd al-–Aziz’s last
years and under his first successor.
Institutions in the 1950s were malleable and often adjusted to the authority and
status of the individuals or factions leading them. They were occasionally created from
scratch to either bolster or weaken specific players. Although there was a general trend
of functional differentiation, concerns of power balancing were as important in the
emergence of specific bureaucratic designs: princes had to be accorded roles according
to their seniority while also satisfying their ambitions as much as possible. In the
summer of 1951, –Abdallah bin Faisal was made minister of health and interior for the
reported reason that he should be equal in status to Minister of Defense Prince Mish–al.40
Conversely, the likely motivation for a 1952 plan to set up the Ministry of Air Force, with
Mish–al as minister and his full brother Mit–ib as deputy, was to prevent aviation issues
from falling under the authority of the new Ministry of Communications under Prince
Talal.41 At some point in 1953, it seemed that Saudi Arabia would have to separate
government airlines, as Mish–al and Talal could not agree.42
When Talal resigned as minister of communications in 1955, the communications
portfolio was reassigned to the Ministry of Finance (then under the commoner Moham-
mad Suroor). Talal told U.S. diplomats that this was essentially a solution to avoid picking
one of the various princely candidates for the post and offending the others.43 There was
no indication that qualification played a great role in creating and apportioning posts:
more talented princes operated next to worse ones.44 As far as we know, no prince was
ever fired for performance failure in the 1950s or 1960s. Although the historical record
does not allow us to establish the precise motivations for every specific institutional
decision, we can conclude that balances of power and personal ambitions within the Al
Sa–ud have played a uniquely prominent role.
It seems that tailoring institutions around personal needs and conflicts was also repro-
duced on a smaller scale by senior commoner administrators. The then deputy minister
of finance, Mohammad Suroor, for example, was given a new post supervising both
pilgrimage and broadcasting for the reason that the heads of these two departments were
rivals, and making Suroor titular head of both meant that neither would be subordinate
to the other.45 When Saudi ambassador to the United States Asad Al-Faqih returned to
the kingdom in 1955, a new senior post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was created
according to his own proposal.46 Although skills often did matter when selecting com-
moner administrators (such as oil minister Abdallah Tariki or minister of state Abdallah
bin –Adwan), structures of clientelism and long-term loyalty also played a prominent
role, often to the detriment of performance.47
Under King Saud, senior appointments and institutional changes were increasingly
a function of his rivalry with Crown Prince Faisal. Apart from Talal, all new princely
appointments to his “reform” cabinet had no administrative experience,48 clearly indi-
cating that building a coalition in the family was his main concern. The Sa–ud–Faisal
struggle has been recounted in detail elsewhere.49 A few examples of how it affected the
institutional setup of the kingdom will suffice. The defense establishment was a prime
battleground in terms of successive appointments but also administrative engineering.
King Saud detached the Royal Guard under Mus–ad bin Sa–ud from the Ministry of
Defense to weaken Mish–al and strengthen his own sons. The guard was temporarily the
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most powerful military unit.50 In May 1955 Sa–ud decreed the formation of a modern
national guard, which was to be headed by another of his sons, Khalid bin Sa–ud. This
again was seen as a step against Mish–al, who had been able to prey on national guard
resources before, as it had been a relatively weak institution headed by a commoner.51 In
1964, after Sa–ud’s final defeat by Faisal, the Royal Guard was attached to the Ministry
of Defense, implying its disbandment as independent institution. Institutional design
followed power politics, sometimes resulting in the parallel existence of very similar
structures.52
Institutions as Fiefdoms
Institutions being tokens in political games, they were also used for building personal
fortunes and expanding one’s following. Proprietary patterns were established early on:
in his later years, –Abd al-–Aziz “granted” several of the new agencies to specific factions
among his sons, a process in which maternal lines played an important role. Examples
include the Royal Guard, the governorships of Riyadh and Mecca, and the Ministry
of Defense, all controlled successively by full brothers. Control of specific institutions
through factions within the Al Sa–ud has been a prevalent pattern ever since. Similarly,
well-positioned commoner families developed a permanent claim over certain offices.53
Most senior figures used the institutions they controlled to personally distribute favors
and conclude business deals. King Sa–ud built up a following of contractors whom he
delighted with large contracts for palaces and grossly oversized ministries.54 Minister
of Defense Mish–al—known as one of the richest princes in subsequent decades55—was
said to have used his privileged post to keep millions of freshly minted riyals for himself,
as did a number of regional governors.56 Most princes in bureaucratic positions quickly
surrounded themselves with growing numbers of hangers-on, advisers, and business
partners.57
Different princes had different followings: Sa–ud tended to cling to his father’s foreign
advisers58 whereas Faisal had a larger number of Hijazi among his clients.59 Fahd later
on would bring more young, educated Najdis into the state apparatus.60 Senior clients
all had an urban background in common; they were often from client-notable families
and sometimes upstarts of indistinct background who had worked their way up as loyal
servants. Tribes were hardly represented in the new elite.61 More important in our context
is that the elite was very small in size and was built in a top-down fashion by princes,
with hierarchies between princes and commoners very strict.62 Clienteles were local
and did not represent broader social groups, as most of society remained outside of the
state’s reach.
Formal and Informal Authority in a Fluctuating Bureaucracy
Saudi Arabia largely lacked an administrative tradition and societal checks on bureau-
cracy. Combined with family politics, this meant that the unprecedented growth of
bureaucracy in the 1950s was not accompanied by much rationalization. Although some
new agencies helped to increase the provision of public services,63 the sudden availability
of resources also led to uncontrolled, Byzantine expansion based on patronage.
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Many young administrators were highly inexperienced, especially the royal ones,
who had without exception been educated only in the royal court.64 A U.S. dispatch
described Minister of Defense Mish–al as dignified and serious about his job, but in
terms of institution building, “through lack of education, knowledge and experience,
performance results have been practically nil as the Ministry remains unorganized and
its procedures are on an entirely personal basis. He [Mish–al] leans heavily for advice
and recommendations on foreign counsel.”65 Similarly, by the time Talal’s Ministry of
Communications was reattached to the Ministry of Finance, he was said to have achieved
very little.66
The personalized nature of institutions went along with a lack of meaningful formal
procedures. In the 1950s there were no proper systems of civil-service training, seniority,
or even document filing.67 The U.S. embassy at the time was trying to keep track of ad-
ministrative development and drew charts of agencies, but “ . . . the diagrams themselves
have proved to be most confused, since this Government does not lend itself at all well
to such schematic presentation . . . [T]he organization is so confused, particularly among☞ OK? YES
the lower echelons, that an unwarranted level of research would be required in order to
fill out charts at all these levels. . . . [S]ince organization means little to this Government,
it is very flexible and changes with such rapidity that charts are outmoded almost before
they can be prepared.”68
Aramco at the time kept a roster of Saudi public personnel, on which the government
itself depended due to lack of oversight over its fluctuating institutions.69 Several agen-
cies, such as the Ministry of Economy, created in July 1953, remained merely on paper,70
as did senior ministerial positions.71 When posts were actually filled, they frequently
were just depositories for clients of ministers or princes, adding “excess baggage” to the
bureaucracy.72
Informal authority determined the actual importance of institutions. The bits of bu-
reaucracy that mattered were run by important princes or by commoners very close to the
court. A formally important institution like the Ministry of Commerce, although headed
by leading Hijazi merchant Mohammad Alireza, proved to be largely powerless.73
Undercut by successive ministers of finance with better royal access, and with no
commercial regulations emerging from the Council of Ministers, he complained about
de facto having no role.74 Conversely, a previously inconsequential post such as that
of comptroller general suddenly became important when it was filled by senior prince
Mus–ad bin –Abdalrahman.75
As far as institutions mattered, their day-to-day operations were often carried out
rather autonomously, with ministries run as fiefdoms.76 The administrative sprawl and
personalized nature of authority meant that coordination between agencies was largely
lacking, with different institutions often producing directly contradictory decisions and
jurisdictions remaining unclear.77 As early as 1952, six different entities were supposed
to be in charge of economic planning.78
State–Society Relations: Mobility and Local Clientelism
Although the formal state was still small, unorganized, and self-absorbed, its combina-
tion of growing resources and institutional fluidity meant that it offered great chances
for a small number of people in the right place at the right time. Access to the expanding
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court, with its growing needs for material supplies from the 1940s on, offered great
opportunities for social and economic mobility and influence peddling. Many of the
prominent Saudi merchant families established their privileged positions as suppliers
to King –Abd al-–Aziz, with some of them being granted exclusive trade agencies by
the king, which they still hold today. Players from the Jomaih, Rajhi, or Juffali families
made their first appearances, often emerging from rather humble Najdi backgrounds
(Jomaih, for example, was the king’s grocer from the village of Shaqra; Rajhi was a
money changer in the Riyadh suq).79 Several of the king’s advisers and their offspring
also used their positions to venture into business, including the Pharaon and Khashoggi
families.
In a related pattern, auxiliary positions at court could be the starting point of public-
service careers. –Abdallah bin –Adwan, for example, worked his way up to head of
the important ministry of finance branch in the (oil-rich) eastern province, without
any formal education, thanks to the intervention of then crown prince Sa–ud, whose
bodyguard he had been.80 Id bin Salem moved from being a mechanic to head of the
royal garage and one of Sa–ud’s leading advisors.81 Interpreters –Abdallah Tariqi and
Mohamad Ibrahim Mas–ud (the latter with the U.S. embassy) became the minister of oil
and minister of state, respectively.82
–Abdallah Sulaiman’s Empire: Mobility of Commoners
It is the Najdi Sulaiman Al-Hamdan family that probably has combined both patterns—
merchant and bureaucratic mobility—most masterfully. Their story colorfully illustrates
the contingent, personalized, and fiefdom-like trajectory of early institution building, as
well as the great associated opportunities of clientelism.
–Abdallah Sulaiman was a Najdi of humble background who worked his way up from
clerk to the first Saudi minister of finance and close confidant of –Abd al-–Aziz. Until the
early 1950s, Sulaiman’s ministry combined an inordinate range of administrative duties,
its subordinate departments including health, public works, education, and agriculture.
Their workings usually were opaque and left great scope for patronage. At the Ministry
of Finance affiliated customs, Ottoman-inspired clearing procedures involved up to
thirty different signatures, and kickbacks were common. A British diplomat commented
sardonically, “The Director of Posts proudly proclaims that he had British training.
There are naturally Saudi improvements on this; the postage stamp clerk, for instance,
will take the money for letters and stick the stamps on later; after eighteen months in
the job he can build himself a large house.”83 The ministry was well known for its
“widespread system of letting contracts on a basis of personal favoritism rather than
expected performance and cost,”84 the beneficiaries usually being Sulaiman’s merchant
friends.85
Sulaiman, based in Jeddah, was given large administrative discretion by the king.86
His brother Hamad and his son –Abd al-–Aziz were vice and deputy minister respectively,
the higher rank for his brother being created specifically for him (it still exists today).87
Apart from profiteering activities, Hamad was reported to be largely inactive.88
Sulaiman had started to procure government supplies through figureheads in the
1920s, and his merchant friends lent him money without interest, which in turn was
used to purchase goods at inflated prices for the court.89 He was given the lucrative
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cement franchise for the Hijaz in the late 1940s.90 Sulaiman owned palaces and large
tracts of land and had his own entourage of some 400 people. After retiring in 1954,
he ran hotels and a number of trading companies. His descendants are still among the
prominent merchants of Jeddah.91
Several big businessmen were “made” or at least boosted by the Ministry of Finance
during Sulaiman’s time, including some who served under him.92 The case of Hasan
Sharbatli is perhaps the most colorful example of how upstart clients could rapidly gain
status and wealth. The diplomatic note on him bears a lengthy citation:
Climaxing a rags-to-riches career illustrative of the fluidity of Hejazi mercantile society, Hasan
Sharbatli, Jidda merchant and public benefactor, recently received from the King the title of
Honorary Minister of State . . . [making him the ninth of this kind. The title] implies no necessary☞ Block quote
implies verbatim.
Is this interior
quote in original?
NO IT’S MY
OWN
INSERTION. OK
IN []
BRACKETS?
assumption of government powers . . . Sharbatli, who only ten years ago was a fruit-vendor and
small-time auctioneer in Jidda, reportedly gained entry into the favored circles of the Ministry of
Finance by sending to Hamad al SULEIMAN, brother of the minister, a gift of fruit. So pleased
was the recipient that he recommended the appointment of Sharbatli as Government Purchasing
Agent.
In this capacity, Sharbatli evolved an eminently satisfactory relationship with the government.
Selling a hypothetical 5,000 riyals worth of fruit, he would then bill the Ministry for 50,000 riyals
and subsequently share the profits with his sponsors in the Ministry.93
Sharbatli accumulated a total reported credit of 43 million riyals with the government.
Unable to redeem the debt for himself, Sharbatli became one of the kingdom’s largest
charitable benefactors. He became one of the richest men in the kingdom, had a virtual
monopoly on pilgrim travel, and had reportedly given 500,000 riyals for the establish-
ment of the Saudi air force.94 He also set up his own bank.95 Sharbatli’s case illustrates
that although the royal family was clearly at the center of the polity and of state growth,
more or less, random networks of commoners within and around the administration had
great distributional leeway and offered great mobility at an early stage—and the chance
to position oneself for later decades.
The story of Sulaiman, however, also demonstrates how commoners’ local power, in
the final analysis, depends on royal patronage. The minister was a favorite of King –Abd
al-–Aziz but not of his sons Sa–ud and Faisal. Sulaiman and his family left the ministry
one year after –Abd al-–Aziz’s death. Even the most senior and trusted commoner with
a large personal clientele did not have any independent support he could count on once
he had fallen out of favor.
External Advisers and Islands of Efficiency: The Saudi Arabian
Monetary Agency
Before that, however, Sulaiman had surprisingly gotten involved in probably the most
significant attempt at administrative rationalization in the 1950s: the creation of the
Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA). In the early 1950s monetary chaos reigned
in Saudi Arabia.96 Interested in at least minimal economic stability, the U.S. embassy
and Aramco successfully lobbied the king to accept U.S. consultants into the kingdom.
U.S. adviser Arthur Young managed to convince Sulaiman and the king of the need
for basic monetary and banking regulation. Young was mandated by the king to draw
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up a charter for what was to become SAMA within a few hours.97 SAMA derived its
income by charging the government for its services. Its first head was also an American,
and accountants were hired from Lebanon.98
King –Abd al-–Aziz and Sulaiman had been convinced of the existential need for
institution building in this strategic sector. SAMA’s charter and use of expatriate tech-
nocrats bolstered the relative independence of the body. After the Ministry of Finance
temporarily sidelined SAMA,99 in 1957 the governorship was taken over by another
expatriate, Anwar –Ali, who had come to the country with an International Monetary
Fund mission and who held the post as a confidant of King Faisal until his death, in 1974.
Different from other “fiefdom ministries,” SAMA’s well-paid leadership used relative
autonomy and –Abd al-–Aziz’s and Faisal’s clear reform mandates to become one of the
best central banks in the Middle East.
The specific social and political structure of Saudi Arabia gave its political elite
large temporary autonomy, in this specific regard confirming rentier theory. The new
external income left much space for state actors’s individual patronage interests and for
distribution and institutional design to be negotiated within the state. Much of the modern
state was originally created above society, following its own peculiar logic of fiefdoms
and their lateral sprawl. In the 1950s Aramco and the U.S. embassy were probably the
most significant lobbyists for bureaucratic rationalization in the kingdom, ahead of all
domestic groups.100
T H E E M E R G IN G B U R E A U C R AT IC O R D E R U N D E R FA IS A L
Faisal’s Order by Cabinet
U.S. pressure was largely ineffective under Sa–ud, with politics and institutional change
following elite dynamics as described above. Despite U.S. lobbying, no coherent bud-
geting happened,101 and an American Point IV assistance mission was canceled.102 It
was under Faisal that some degree of order was brought into the government apparatus,
as is explained in the following section. Again, this was at least driven as much by royal
family politics as by perceived development needs. Faisal’s struggle with Sa–ud was at
its apex between 1958 and 1962, and it was in this period that institutions were reshaped
most dynamically, with the power interests of the Faisal faction eventually prevailing.
After 1962, a stable balance of elite forces combined with bureaucratic growth and
regularization led to the “locking in” of personal and institutional constellations at the
core of the state.
Some of the institutional balancing games between Faisal and Sa–ud in the field of
security organization have already been adumbrated. After 1958, the struggle between
the two brothers went deeper than that: the core of what the Saudi state was to be was
at stake in the conflict, with fundamentally different institutional concepts deployed by
both players, reflecting the fluidity of Saudi governance structures at the time.
The Saudi drive for political order began with a May 1958 decree that enhanced
the status of the Council of Ministers, with Faisal as prime minister. The reason was
that a coalition within the Al Sa–ud had pushed for enhancing Faisal’s standing against
Sa–ud, who was, among other things, perceived as favoring his sons over his brothers
and incapable of handling the state budget, which was in a severe deficit. The decree
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gave the Council of Ministers the final authority in financial matters. The king could
return decrees to the council, with further steps kept ambiguous.
Although a step toward formal government, the May 1958 institutional redesign most
of all reflected a temporary personal balance of power between Faisal and Sa–ud, as
Sa–ud was to remain king and Faisal responsible to him. Institutions at the very core of
the state were pliable weapons in the struggle. Sa–ud as king with a court had larger quasi-
traditional, patrimonial resources at his disposal and used those to increase his following
through royal handouts and tours through the country. Faisal, conversely, promoted more
modern institutions of rule to boost his otherwise inferior standing, trying to curtail the
royal budget and enforce cabinet rule. There was no superior constitutional (or societal)
framework to contain the struggle to be fought within given institutions.
The brothers’ attitudes toward institutions could be quite instrumental, a point vin-
dicated by the institutional track record of the two protagonists. In 1959 Sa–ud re-
portedly planned the creation of a consultative council with 120 members, including
tribal representatives, –ulama», and members of the Al Sa–ud. It would take over some
responsibilities of the Council of Ministers and hold legislative power.103 It very much
looked like an attempt by Sa–ud, at that time inferior, to regain territory, as the king would
appoint the majlis. It is striking that supposedly “traditional” Sa–ud would forward such
a relatively progressive concept. Conversely, Faisal was very reluctant to give up his
traditional post as vice regent of the Hijaz, although that hampered homogenization
of the national administration in Saudi Arabia. He used the post as a bargaining chip
to attain the premiership.104 If politically expedient, Faisal could hamper bureaucratic
rationalization.
Conversely, Faisal’s buildup of bureaucracy was completely centered on himself. Until
Sa–ud temporarily regained power, in 1960, Faisal achieved a certain separation of state
and royal family affairs and a degree of budgetary control and monetary modernization
with IMF assistance.105 This he accomplished through stark centralization of authority,
however. In addition to being minister of foreign Affairs and finance, in April 1959 he
also took over the interior portfolio. Although this enabled Faisal to exert more control
over regional fiefdoms of other princes, it created a bottleneck of decision making.106
Rated as a thorough individualist by Aramco researchers, Faisal sat on decisions.107
Liberal Saudis, although sometimes conceding that Faisal stuck to formal rules more
clearly than Sa–ud, deplored such overcentralization.108
The Council of Ministers was, most of all, an instrument for Faisal to gain power
through the post of prime minister.109 It is true that after Sa–ud’s fall from grace, in
1962, it somewhat improved policy coordination—not least because the royal diwa¯n
as parallel political actor had disappeared. Faisal was generally willing to devote more
time to the formal workings of government,110 seeing a degree of budgetary control
and more clearly defined administrative units as instruments of stability. Most of his
reformist ambitions beyond the establishment of basic order petered out soon after Sa–ud
had been stripped of all powers in 1964, however. In a period of regional turmoil, Faisal
was interested in stability, not rapid development.
Sa–ud, through his alliance with junior princes, seemed temporarily to introduce more
players into decision making. This was an outcome of his alliance strategy, though,
as was the progressive-developmentalist orientation of the new cabinet: he had relied
before on his father’s small and closed group of decidedly reactionary Syrian advisers.111
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His younger royal allies in turn were further down in the seniority ranking. One can
speculate that they saw progressive politics as a shortcut to positions of power otherwise
unavailable to them.
In any case, the reformist episode proved short lived, as Faisal’s coalition with Fahd
and his full brothers first drove out Talal and his brothers, then Sa–ud. It is telling that
the group that had built the larger alliance within the royal family carried the day. At
no point in the struggle were broader social constituencies mobilized.112 Talal and his
princely allies might have banked on support by “young intellectuals,” having seen the
revolutionary examples of Egypt, Iraq, and Syria. In Saudi Arabia, however, this stratum
remained small, amorphous, and incapable of action. Talal failed to rouse support.113
When progressive adviser –Abd al-–Aziz Mu–ammar briefly gained agenda-setting
power under Sa–ud, this did not reflect a social revolution but rather a temporary
power vacuum between different royal factions. Mu–ammar and his small circle of
friends had no organizational base to rely on and were quickly thrown out when Sa–ud
decided they were damaging to him. At any rate, Mu–ammar had always known that
Sa–ud had deployed him as part of a “power play”114 and not because of a suddenly
discovered reformist zeal. Other “progressive” young Saudis, such as Zaki Yamani and
Hisham Nazer, got the message and had themselves co-opted into senior administrative
positions as docile technocrats under Faisal. Commoner administrators quickly stopped
speechifying about political reform.115
Consolidation of Fiefdoms: The 1962 Cabinet Deal
Throughout the 1960s, the Saudi budgets once again continued to expand—quadrupling
within less than a decade116—and the bureaucratic apparatus grew with them, offering
new mobility for commoners. Ministries of petroleum, Hajj affairs, labor and social
affairs, and information were created between 1960 and 1963. After 1963 and until the
oil boom, however, the growth of the budget implied growth of existing institutions rather
than creation of new ones. The expansion of a number of fiefdoms would continue, but
in a much more orderly manner.
The cabinet that emerged in October 1962 had become the gravitational center of
Saudi politics and represented a post-Sa–ud distribution of power that grew increasingly
immovable. It was based on a stable balance of forces within the Al Sa–ud and was the
end result of the Sa–ud–Faisal struggle. Faisal kept the post of prime minister, which he
would fuse with the kingship from 1964 on (a structure his successors have inherited).117
Faisal’s senior allies in the conflict were rewarded with ministerial posts; Fahd and the
sultan, young and “modernizing” supporters, were given the portfolios of interior and
defense, respectively.
Sticking to established patrimonial patterns, they brought in full brothers to take up
specially designated vice ministry posts in subsequent years.118 The sultan has kept his
ministry ever since, but Fahd handed his portfolio over to his younger brother Nayef
upon becoming crown prince in 1975. Prince –Abdallah, another ally of Faisal, was given
cabinet status and control of the national guard in 1963, which he has kept until today. In
1967, the special post of second deputy prime minister was created for Fahd, underlining
his ambitions to be next in line after his older half-brother Khaled, a moderate figure
Faisal made crown prince for reasons of seniority and intrafamily balance119 despite
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Khaled’s disinterest in politics and lack of a previous government role.120 Institutional
decisions again followed the royal power balance.
All of the major princes embarked on expanding their institutions, which became
irreducibly identified with their persons. Growing budgets allowed for ambitious pro-
grams, most remarkable among them the sultan’s expansion of the Saudi air force in the
1960s.121 Staff numbers, business opportunities, and networks of gatekeepers, brokers,
and business partners expanded concurrently. As the Ministry of Defense was organized
around the sultan (and to a lesser extent his full-brother deputies), all of its organiza-
tional units were oriented toward him as central authority. Armed services and the civil
administration in the ministry hence cooperated little.122 Similarly, –Abdallah was the
figure around whom the national guard was organized. Foreign specialists assessed the
guard’s chains of command as ill defined and overcentralized. As the guard was also
a government agency, the presence of civilians in its headquarters, accountable only to
–Abdallah, decreased its administrative coherence.123
Faisal and the Civil Service: Slow Regularization
Beyond the “sovereignty ministries,” most of the other posts in the 1962 cabinet were
controlled by commoners, as Faisal strove to limit the number of princes in the cabinet
to make it manageable,124 another pattern that would become “locked in,” as most of
the cabinet posts reserved for nonroyals then have been held by commoners until now.
A stable distribution of power did not automatically mean integrated government. Un-
der Faisal the Saudi administration still suffered from enduring problems of overcentral-
ization and lack of coordination between agencies.125 As institutions grew in parallel,
functionally similar bureaucratic units reported to different ministries, and duplication
and conflicts of authority were endemic.126 As all actors were oriented toward Faisal,
there was little horizontal communication of commoner bureaucrats, while Faisal’s
brothers were busy building their fiefdoms. The phenomenon of “paper agencies”
persisted—for example, a Ministry of Justice was decreed in 1962 but not actually set
up until 1971. All good intentions of development planning got lost somewhere between
agency conflicts and an insufficient database.127 The Central Planning Organization, set
up in 1964, had little leverage over other ministries during most of the 1960s,128 and
several ministries never submitted their financial reports to the Ministry of Finance.129
Different from the sprawl of the state in the 1950s, however, was the clear regulariza-
tion of bureaucratic growth both in terms of stability of the overall setup and of internal
bureaucratization of institutions. The setup became less fluid. Although facing an acute
shortage of qualified administrators, Faisal managed to assemble some good commoner
ministers around him, which might explain how at least some decisions were carried
out.130 “Elsewhere,” as one British diplomatic source explains, “as so often in develop-
ing countries, it [was] the bureaucratic bindweed that [took] root and proliferated most
quickly, its function being to choke decision and action.” The “bureaucratic bindweed,”
however. did go along with institutionalization of the civil service, making for gradual
institutional consolidation.
Faisal achieved a discernible rationalization of the bureaucracy. As early as June 1958,
a royal decree reforming the civil service was issued. It clarified the classification of
employees, salary schedules, and criteria for hiring and terminating employment.131 The
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use of public offices for private gain was prohibited and severe penalties threatened. Pri-
vate business activities of bureaucrats were very common at the time, and the Americans
rated the decree as a serious attempt by Faisal to decrease malpractice.132
To be sure, overcoming the shortage of qualified and committed personnel was an
uphill struggle in a grossly undereducated society.133 In the early 1960s, the Institute of
Public Administration, in Riyadh, was set up with international assistance and imparted
basic administrative skills to increasing numbers of Saudis. Having to start almost from
scratch, its impact was only gradual. At the end of the 1960s, the pool of skilled adminis-
trators was still very small and recruitment often based on nepotism.134 Many bureaucrats
were involved in business interests tied to their respective agency.135 Absenteeism was
rampant,136 and attempts by a large Ford Foundation consultancy mission in the 1960s
to create a merit-based public service did not yield significant results, as the Central
Personnel Bureau proved unable to break into the turf of other ministries.137
Faisal’s own commitment to orderly and rule-bound administration should not be
overstated. In his context, he was austere,138 but that did not mean that he did not have
his own trustees, brokers, and business clients, whom he paid off in various ways.139 The
Alireza family, close to Faisal since his time as Hijazi vice regent, was amply supplied
with defense-related contracts.140 Princes from Faisal’s own family branch were heavily
involved in business.141 Although the clientelist distribution of budgets and deals was
relatively well controlled under Faisal, his rule was no exception to the basic pattern.142
Still, all nepotism and clientelism occurred within a progressively bureaucratized
institutional setting, the main components and cleavages of which did not change fun-
damentally after the early 1960s. The 1971 comprehensive civil-service law led to
further consolidation of bureaucratic rules and clearer formal concepts of salary scales,
seniority, and hierarchy.143 The Institute of Public Administration augmented its profile
under the leadership of –Abd al-–Aziz Quraishi in the late 1960s, and increasing numbers
of foreign-trained Saudis entered public service.144 The internal structures of agencies,
though still fluid in many cases, were much better defined and permanent than ten years
earlier.145
T H E B U R E A U C R AT IC IM M O RTA L IZ AT IO N O F F IE F D O M S
IN T H E 1 9 7 0 S
The final and dizzying phase of Saudi state expansion after the 1973 oil boom hap-
pened in a much more orderly way, based on existing institutions, than in the 1950s.146
Paradoxically, bureaucratization and state growth also led to entrenchment of existing
fiefdoms in the boom—the final phase of state growth. As the budget quadrupled and
total state employees increased from 52,000 in 1960 to 124,000 in 1970,147 royals had
growing powers of patronage in their realms, and entrenchment of civil-service rules
made for increased institutional stability on lower levels.148
The defense budget, usually above one-quarter of overall state expenditure, allowed
Prince Sultan to expand his ministerial fiefdom to a full “state within a state,” attaching
large-scale housing, health, and educational infrastructure to his ministry. The largest
of Sultan’s artificial “military cities” in the northern periphery of the kingdom was
supposed to house 70,000 people.149 Although the Saudi military was gradually formal-
ized, all organizational units of the ministry remained organized around Sultan as the
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central authority, hampering communication among them.150 The national guard under
–Abdallah developed similar structures on a smaller scale, having its own “cities” and
parallel housing, education, and health systems.151 The Ministry of Interior under Fahd
and Nayef, dubbed a “rule unto itself”152 by a seasoned British diplomat, also built up
its own infrastructure.
All of the major fiefs conferred enormous patronage power to their heads through the
sheer scale of employment,153 the provision of select services, and numerous business
contracts of various sizes. Considerable parts of society were drawn into the orbit of big
government agencies as clients in one form or another.154
The dynamics of growth often reinforced segmentation. The Ministry of Defense,
the national guard, and the Ministry of Interior seem to have seen repeated competition
over budget allocations, and there was a persistent overlap in security functions.155
The autonomous power of senior princes meant that they ignored budgetary rules in
their procurement, undermining coherent economic planning.156 The parallel buildup of
independent housing and health services prevented integrated sectoral policies.157 The
parallel power bases of princes made national decision making and, on a lower level,
day-to-day policy coordination more difficult.
Segmentation was reproduced on a smaller scale among agencies headed by trusted
commoners. Due to the underdevelopment of general infrastructure and public services,
agencies under conditions of fiscal abundance strove to create their own services to
be able to develop autonomously.158 Institutions functioned in more predictable and
formal ways than in past decades; the civil service law was refined in 1977 and a
further empowered Civil Service Bureau created.159 However, the persistent hierarchical
orientation of various agencies meant that they rarely coordinated in policy and budgeting
matters. In the process of rapid growth they acquired their own vested interests and,
typically, their own housing and other infrastructure annexes and in at least one case,
their own TV studio and gas station.160
However, similar to the case of SAMA in the 1950s, further state expansion in the
1970s and early 1980s allowed for new islands of efficiency to emerge, staffed by
the most promising technocrats and given relative autonomy from the rest of the civil
service. These include the Saudi Ports Authority, the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation, and the Riyadh Development Authority.161 Although the core structure
of state and regime remained unaltered, the oil boom still allowed for new institutional
creations on a technocratic level, offering great mobility to aspiring administrators, some
of them successfully co-opted into the system despite their originally leftist leanings.162
Similarly, the boom was the last time new big business names were added to those that
had emerged in the 1950s, most saliently that of later Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq
Hariri, who became a billionaire construction magnate under the patronage of King
Fahd.
Mobility Closure and Congealment
The institutional fluidity of the 1950s and 1960s and the enduring mobility in the 1970s
and early 1980s stand in sharp contrast to the stasis and mobility closure since the mid-
1980s. Since the end of the boom, the expansion of the Saudi state has largely stopped
and with it change and mobility within the system. The institutions created since the
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early 1950s have congealed into a permanent setup through bureaucratic formalization
and resource constraints but also through sheer size and scope of the state.
Some well-known facts suffice to illustrate how the end of the boom has brought an
end to the internal dynamic of the Saudi system: not only have all the leading princes
clung to their posts (until death in the case of Fahd), but also Saudi business has seen
very few big newcomers since the oil bust in 1986. The turnover of technocrats in the
cabinet has decreased markedly, with their average age strongly increasing.
There has been little change in the setup of government agencies, which have proven
to persist once they had grown. The socioeconomic entitlements created through state
growth seem to have fettered the once autonomous system, with the wage bill steadily
increasing as a share of public expenditure between the early 1980s and the late 1990s.
As more social groups have been tied to the state through the formalized clientage of
employment and service provision, the government, it appears, has become increas-
ingly immobile, largely incapable or unwilling to impose cuts on the public payroll
and subsidized public services.163 The stickiness of bureaucratic employment prevents
institutional reengineering. Policy in the last twenty years has been limited mostly to
“putting out fires,” with few grand initiatives.164
C O N C L U S IO N
For those who know the modern Saudi bureaucratic behemoth, its unmovable institutions
and administrative stasis, the great fluidity of early years as traced in this article is hard
to imagine. The modern Saudi bureaucracy was created in the 1950s and early 1960s by
an elite that was largely unconstrained by society or established bureaucratic structures.
The rapid, personalized creation of government institutions happened in a completely
top-down fashion and in a relative political vacuum. Political agency and voluntarism
determined state formation at least as much as the development needs of Saudi society
did. The Al Sa–ud laterally expanded into a state apparatus that was most of all geared
upon their internal distribution of power. The rapid shifts in institutional design reflected
the unique autonomy of the early Saudi rentier-state and its role as playing field for intra-
elite balancing games.
Saudi bureaucracy building often seems not to be a case of “form follows function”
but of “form follows family.” Institutional reforms often were instruments in an intra-
elite power game as much as attempts to modernize the state. Whereas Yizraeli sees
primarily a clash between different ideologies of rule and development between Sa–ud
and Faisal, the present account adds a rather more instrumental view of institutional
initiatives by both players, with institutions as flexible tokens of power. It is not pos-
sible to glean specific princely motivations from the archival record on every single
institutional decision. We do know, however, that power politics within the family—
whatever its details—consistently loomed larger than other considerations when it came
to negotiating institutional change.
Shifts in State Autonomy
Rentier-state theory posits state autonomy as a result of external state income. As
far as autonomy is a useful concept at all, the present historical analysis of Saudi
institutions indicates that it is not constant over time: early state autonomy seems to
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have been uniquely large, and political agency determined structures of rule. In later
years, conversely, the weight of established structures has taken away much of the
political and distributional leeway the Saudi elite used to have. The rentier argument
that external revenues give state elites free reign—at least in underdeveloped states with
relatively cohesive elites—seems to make much more sense in early phases of state
building and, to a lesser degree, while the expansion lasts. Similar patterns may be at
work in other late-developing rentier-states. Frequent shifts in alliance and redesigns of
the fledgling Omani state under Qaboos in the early 1970s, for example, have given way
to more static development in subsequent decades.165
Path Dependency of Institutional Design
Many of today’s permanent features of the Saudi state can be traced back to early
contingencies and the crucial juncture of 1962. Civil Aviation’s attachment to the Min-
istry of Defense, the Vice Ministry of Finance, the large size of the national guard,
the omnipresent role of the Ministry of Interior—all are outcomes of the politics of
the day, which happened to be perpetuated by bureaucratic growth and/or agreements
to maintain a given power balance. Similarly, the composition of significant parts of
the Saudi private sector is often an outcome of chance encounters that happened many
decades ago. The expanding Saudi rentier-state provides powerful examples of “path
dependency,” the idea that relatively small, early events can have a strong influence
on subsequent structural developments. The rapid growth of rentier-states can lead to
a “telescoping” effect, magnifying the effects of early decisions manifold and locking
them in as states grow mature and harder to change.
More than any other event, the 1962 cabinet deal shaped the face of Saudi politics for
the subsequent half century. However, it also appears somewhat contingent in retrospec-
tive: there were reported offers by Sa–ud to make Fahd his prime minister, which the latter
rejected.166 Had Fahd accepted, Saudi Arabia and its institutions of governance would
look much different today. There were also rumors that Mohammad bin –Abd al-–Aziz,
an irascible older brother of Fahd, could be made minister of finance, which again would
have changed the balance of power—and quite likely, institutions—tremendously.167
Instead, sober Minister of Finance Prince Mus–ad bin –Abdalrahman controlled the
fisc and helped to limit the intrusion of royals into the state. Although this policy was
loosened under Fahd, Faisal’s decision to keep princes largely out of technocratic cabinet
posts in 1962 established a pattern that has been perpetuated until today and that differs
from other Gulf Cooperation Council states with large ruling families, which tend to
have princely ministers of finance, oil, and commerce.168
Path Dependency of State Segmentation
Regularization and growth of the bureaucracy helped to reduce the fluidity of admin-
istrative structures, increasingly limiting change to the lower rungs of the state and
entrenching senior office holders within an established power balance. It also helped to
deepen the fiefdom character of certain institutions that dominate the Saudi scene today.
It is ironic that in the first place it had been the lack of clearly defined bureaucratic
hierarchies that tended to give institutions the character of personal courts and enabled
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small-scale empire building. With formal procedures loosely defined, ministries were
frequently used for patronage and to recruit allies—not only by royals but also by well-
positioned commoners, several of who left their mark on the Saudi state. As the state
grew more complex and the Al Sa–ud delegated authority only in specific institutional
contexts, the fragmentation of the state did not disappear but was often consolidated
through bureaucratization. Although Faisal’s overcentralization persisted, agencies often
kept their island character, communicating mostly vertically.
Again, many institutional idiosyncrasies of Saudi Arabia would not be thinkable
without rent surpluses that allowed institutional sprawl and costly redundancy. In a
starkly contrasting example from an originally quite similar country, John Davis has
argued that oil rents in Libya allowed for the experiment of abolishing significant parts
of the state.169 What these two very different oil states seem to demonstrate is that
rents can allow for unusual, possibly dysfunctional institutional experiments without
predicting what these will look like.
Approaching rentier-states from this angle, the focus is once more on contingency and
agency, which are in turn crucial to understanding the internal heterogeneity of the Saudi
state. Oil income has in some cases allowed for the creation of very efficient bureaucratic
islands—SAMA and the like, where select commoners played crucial roles—but in
others has boosted neopatrimonialism. As long as the system expanded, oil created great
leeway to freely design institutions and in very different ways. Generalizations about
the nature of the state are hence difficult. As political agency intervenes, rents do not
automatically create inefficiency and corruption. At the same time, rapidly increasing
rents may create a temptation to build institutional fiefdoms, as these can be convenient
devices to cement coalitions within the elite. Again, this is not an automatic outcome,
but the record of other oil states indicates that it is a distinct possibility and yet one
overlooked by rentier theories.170
Sarah Yizraeli contends that the management of family politics through handing over
control of functionally differentiated formal institutions to senior royal players is more
modern than the old patrimonialism under Ibn Sa–ud and his first successor, centered
mostly on the king’s court. As soon as individual formal posts become royal fiefs of their
own, this judgment might be questionable. The paradox of Saudi state development is that
modern, differentiated bureaucracy and royal patrimonialism have grown concurrently.
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